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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of underwriter reputation on the valuation of
Malaysian initial public offerings (IPOs).
Design/methodology/approach – This study employed cross-sectional multiple regression models to
analyse the relationship between underwriter reputation and IPO valuation that included 466 IPOs listed on
Bursa Malaysia from 2000 to 2017.
Findings – The results revealed that underwriter reputation had a significant negative association with IPO
valuation. Firms that engaged the services of reputable underwriters had their IPO offer prices set lower than
the intrinsic values during the listing. After incorporating firms’ size, this study found a positive relationship
between underwriter reputation and IPO valuation. Big firms (high quality) hired reputable underwriters for
certification purposes as issuers were aware that the cost of hiring a reputable underwriter would be justified
by increased transparency after listing. Therefore, firms that engaged reputable underwriters had
approximately fair values since issuers assumed that the price would be close to the intrinsic value
following enhanced transparency post-listing.
Research limitations/implications – Future studies should focus on other non-financial factors, such as
auditor reputation.
Originality/value – The present study provides new insights into the certification role of underwriters in
valuing IPOs in the Malaysian market.
Keywords Information asymmetry, IPOs, Price-multiple, Underwriter reputation, Valuation
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Underwriters assume an important role in initial public offering (IPO) issuances, specifically
during firms’ valuation process before the IPO pricing. Underwriters acquire the sources of
information about firms’ prospects in determining the firms’ decision to go public and
deciding the firms’ intrinsic values as a guideline for setting the offer prices (Deloof et al.,
2009). Theoretically, IPOs are fair-priced if their offer prices are equal to the market prices on
the first trading day. Nonetheless, one of the key issues in IPO valuation is mispricing, as
investors’ sentiments will invariably influence the market prices on the first trading day.
When the first-day market prices are higher (lower) than the offer price, it is known as an
underpricing (overpricing) anomaly (Chen et al., 2004).
InMalaysia, the underpricing level is higher than in other countries and emergingmarkets
due to greater information asymmetries (Loughran et al., 1994). Figure 1 shows the statistics
of Malaysian IPOs listed between 2000 and 2017, which were underpriced, over-priced or fair
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period, except in 2008, which reported that approximately 65.22% of the IPOs listed were
over-priced. The mispricing condition is attributed to the pricing mechanism used by
underwriters in determining the IPO offer price. In a developed country such as the United
States (US), the book-building mechanism is used for the IPO issuance to obtain information
from the market and institutional investors during the IPO roadshow before setting the offer
price. The IPO prices should reflect their intrinsic values to encourage aftermarket share
subscriptions amongst investors and ensure steady appreciations in stock prices (Mohd-
Rashid et al., 2018). According to Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990), the overvaluation of book-built
IPOs typically occurred during the early aftermarket trading as a result of optimism amongst
investors, leading to over- or under-reaction in the first month of trading. Furthermore,
Bommel et al. (2010) argued that it took almost one week for IPO prices to be stabilised in the
US market to reflect their intrinsic values. This statement indicates that underwriters assign
immediate information aggregation to the book-building mechanism.
The majority of Malaysian firms use the fixed-price mechanism when issuing IPOs
(Tajuddin et al., 2015). The offer price of a firm is based on the underwriter’s information
sources. Meanwhile, investors’ views of firms’ qualities are not incorporated in the IPO
pricing, which makes it difficult for prospective investors to determine the intrinsic values of
firms. Not all information concerning the intrinsic values of firms is reflected in the offer price,
and it is assumed that the IPO prices only stabilise more than a week after listing. However,
Yong (2013) affirmed that prices in Malaysia tend to stabilise on the fifth trading day of the
IPOs. However, the study covered the samples from the year 2004 to 2011. In other words,
the price stabilisation period of fixed-price IPOs inMalaysia might be longer. Referring to the
evidence from Figure 1 and contradictory findings on price stabilisation, this study is
motivated to examine the IPO valuation based on the offer price, first-day market price,
average first-week price and average first-month price.
Given the importance of valuation for the success of IPOs in the Malaysian market, the
current study is interested in examining pre-IPO information which could potentially explain
the IPO values by focussing on the certification role of underwriter reputation. Before
proceeding to describe the certification role of underwriters, the present study suggests that
firms should determine the appropriate valuation method for estimating the intrinsic values.
The present study adopted the price-multiple method to estimate the intrinsic values of IPOs
(Cassia et al., 2004; Chang and Tang, 2007; How et al., 2007; Kim and Ritter, 1999;
Figure 1.
Total number of IPOs
listed and percentage
of total number of
underpriced, over-
priced and fair priced
in Malaysia
MF
Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 2004). In Malaysia, the abolishment of guidelines on using
price-to-earnings (P/E) in IPO pricing in 1996 has enabled underwriters to employ other
valuation methods to estimate the intrinsic values. However, the intrinsic value estimation
and comparable firms’ information are rarely published in Malaysian IPO prospectuses. In
contrast, in European countries, the pre-IPO estimated values are required to be included in
the prospectuses which are then made available to investors for valuation and share
subscription decisions (Cassia et al., 2004; Deloof et al., 2009; Roosenboom, 2012). Thus, this
study employed price-multiple methods, namely, price-to-earnings (P/E), price-to-book (P/B)
and price-to-sales (P/S), to determine the most accurate valuation method in the Malaysian
market. It is assumed that the best valuation model eliminates bias and increases the
valuation’s explainability. Then, the ideal and accurate valuation model was used to measure
the IPO valuation ratio (P/V) (Purnanamdam and Swaminathan, 2004), which was estimated
using a regression model based on pre-IPO information.
One of the strategies for successful and highly transparent IPOs is by hiring reputable
investment banks as underwriters of new issues. Underwriters act as information producers
of IPOs in which their reputations are reliant on the quality of information that they provided
(Corwin and Schultz, 2005). The present study proposes that the certification role of reputable
underwriters has the ability to influence the IPO value by reducing ex ante uncertainties in
new issues. Roosenboom (2012) argued that using prestigious underwriters reduce valuation
biases in the European market such that the offer prices are set closer to the intrinsic values.
Chua (2014) contended that reputable underwriters have more reputational concerns during
the “hot” market, which in turn, induce underwriters to fair-value IPOs in the US market.
However, Chemmanur and Krishnan (2012) contended that using prestigious underwriters in
IPO issuances obtain higher offer prices and aftermarket prices compared to the intrinsic
values due to the greater marketing efforts to allure investors to subscribe for the IPOs.
The findings above on the influence of underwriter reputation on IPO valuation in
developed markets might not be relevant for emerging markets, specifically in Malaysia.
IPOs listed in emerging markets are always characterised by severe ex ante uncertainties
(Eldomiaty, 2008) and low levels of information efficiency (Chan et al., 2008). Accordingly,
longer period will be required for the information obtained by underwriters to be reflected
fully in the IPOs’ offer prices, which could cause the underwriter’s certification role in
emerging markets to be different from in developed markets. There are two reasons for this
phenomenon, which are related to the high level of information asymmetry in the Malaysian
stock market. First, the majority of Malaysian firms use the fixed-price mechanismwhere the
offer prices of IPOs are determined by the underwriters before the listing date (Mohd-Rashid
et al., 2014; Yong, 2011). Potential investors do not have the opportunity to disclose their
valuation views of new issues, leading to higher ex ante uncertainties andmore heterogeneity
in investors’ opinions in the immediate aftermarket. Second, the Malaysian IPO market is
characterised by a weak regulatory environment and lenient listing requirements, which
cause higher ex ante uncertainties (Jelic et al., 2001; Moshirian et al., 2010).
The current study contributes to the existing literature because to the best of the author’s
knowledge, this issue has never been addressed in Malaysia. Numerous studies focussed on
the effect of underwriter reputation on IPO underpricing based on the concept of information
asymmetry. Nevertheless, the available research offers no direct evidence on the relationship
between underwriter reputation and IPO valuation. This study extended the works of prior
Malaysian studies on underpricing, such as Ammer and Ahmad-Zaluki (2016), Abdullah and
Taufil-Mohd (2004) and Sundarasen et al. (2017), as well as on pricing by Mohd-Rashid et al.
(2018) by narrowing down on the role of underwriter reputation in IPO valuation. In ensuring
greater transparency after an IPO listing, firms prefer reputable underwriters who have
superior information to issue their IPOs, thus reducing the underpricing cost and setting high





conjectures that the certification role of reputable underwriters may differ across the issuing
firms in Malaysia. It is because the ability of underwriters to reflect firms’ true values in the
offer prices depends on the degree of uncertainty faced by firms. High information
asymmetry is expected to weaken the ability of underwriters to certify IPOs (Yung and
Zender, 2010).
This study also established that the credibility of underwriters is a key factor for investors
in decidingwhether to invest in IPOs, given that reputable underwriters serve as high-quality
investment banks in certifying new issues. This study extends the works on long-run IPO
performance by Jelic et al. (2001) andTong andAhmad (2015) by focussing on the certification
and signalling function of underwriters in investors’ valuations. The present study argues
that the reputation of the underwriter may convey the quality of the firm, which leads to
greater share subscription amongst retail investors and enhances the firm’s value in the
aftermarket following the IPO. This is because retail investors believe that reputable
underwriters are high-quality underwriters who are informed about the firm’s prospects.
Concerning the severe uncertainty issue in Malaysia, the present study contends that
information asymmetry could affect the certification and signalling role of reputable
underwriters in investors’ valuation in the IPO aftermarket. However, this issue was not
discussed in prior studies. Thus, this study attempts to fill the gaps by examining the
influence of underwriter reputation on IPO valuation based on the certification theory.
This study has several procedures. Section 2 illustrates the literature works concerning
IPO valuation and underwriter reputation. Section 3 discusses the data andmethodology, the
variables used and the model specification of this study. Section 4 presents the results of




The highlights of the vast IPO valuation literature are on the offer prices and share prices in
the IPO aftermarket. Before the IPO pricing stage, the underwriter needs to conduct a
valuation of the firm so that the intrinsic value of the firm can be estimated. The underwriter
estimates the firm’s intrinsic value by relying on the firm’s fundamental performances, for
instance, earnings, book values and revenues (Yeh et al., 2008). The price-multiple method is
frequently recommended and used in pricing IPOs. The literature on IPO valuation has
documented the effectiveness of price-multiple methods in obtaining accurate valuation
(Berkman et al., 2000; Chang andTang, 2007; How et al., 2007; Kim andRitter, 1999; Sahoo and
Rajib, 2013). Kim andRitter (1999) and Chang andTang (2007) found that forecasted earnings
in the P/E of comparable firms from identical industries and with revenue characteristics
have a higher valuation accuracy. It is believed that forecasted earnings incorporate
information about the IPO proceeds that are proposed for financing business growth
activities (Firth et al., 1995). Cassia et al. (2004) revealed the P/B yielded a high precision of
valuation accuracy using book values as the indicator of firms’ future rates of profitability.
Aggarwal et al. (2009) implied that industry-based P/S multiples act as a proxy for firms’
growth in valuing IPOs. How et al. (2007) found that in theAustralian IPOmarket,P/E yielded
negative and less prediction error when comparable firms were matched based on identical
industries and firm size. In addition, the intrinsic values based on P/Ewere closer to the first-
day IPO market prices than to the offer prices.
The negative valuation errors in prior studies could be explained by the deliberate
underpricing by underwriters in which the offer prices of firms were set lower than their
intrinsic values (How et al., 2007). The present study argues that underwriters attempt to
undervalue IPOs to induce investors’ sentiment to participate in the IPO market. Yeh et al.
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(2008) documented that IPO undervaluation was linked to the fixed-price mechanism in the
majority of Taiwanese firms. However, Purnanamdam and Swaminathan (2004) reported
that IPOs were overvalued by 14–50% at offer prices depending on the operating
characteristics of firms. Overvalued IPOs acquired greater extent of underpricing in which
first-day prices did not reflect the intrinsic values of firms due to the effects of market
sentiment and investors’ optimism. Based on the theory byMiller (1977), greater involvement
of optimistic investors can increase prices and drive higher valuations of IPOs. Hence, it is
expected that the degree of valuation of the offer price by underwriters with superior
information and valuation by investors who are subject to information asymmetry of the
prices in the immediate aftermarket will be affected by pre-IPO information from firms’
prospectuses, specifically the underwriter’s reputation.
2.2 Underwriter reputation
Underwriters are certifying agents who produce information regarding firms’ intrinsic values
to the IPO market that is subjected to great information asymmetries between issuers and
investors (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994). Underwriters act as information producers of
IPOs in which their reputation is reliant on the quality of information that they provided
(Corwin and Schultz, 2005). In other words, underwriters are established as low-quality
intermediaries if they provide inaccurate information about firms’ qualities.
The present study proposes the use of certification hypothesis to explain the influence of
underwriter reputation on IPO valuation. The certification hypothesis is developed based on
the core assumption that the reputation of underwriters serves to certify firms’ quality (Booth
and Smith, 1986; Carter and Manaster, 1990). Some prior studies that investigated the
association between underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing obtained a negative
association, that is, prestigious underwriters are linked with reduced underpricing (e.g.
Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Carter and Manaster, 1990; Kenourgios et al., 2007; Jelic et al., 2001).
Carter and Manaster (1990) extended the studies by Beatty and Ritter (1986) and Rock (1986)
in identifying the link between reputable underwriters and firms with a low-risk profile, and
the firms’ IPOswere found to obtain low underpricing. Reputable underwriters are expensive,
and low-risk firms engage these prestigious underwriters as a platform to market their
credibility. Besides, prestigious underwriters promote IPOs with a low-risk profile to
maintain their prestige. Prior studies documented that prestigious underwriters substantially
lower the underpricing levels and have a positive influence on long-run IPO performances
(Bruton et al., 2009; Carter et al., 1998; Su andBangsassa, 2011). It means the use of a reputable
underwriter conveys a signal to potential investors of high-quality firms, which in turn give
investors a steady growth in returns over the long term.
The literature mentioned above can be used to explain underwriter reputation and IPO
valuation in the present study. This study is aware of only a few studies that have examined
the relationship between underwriter reputation and IPO valuation. Chua (2014) revealed a
negative coefficient of underwriter reputationwhile reviewing the valuation ofUS IPOs during
the setting of the offer price. The offer price is set closer to firms’ intrinsic values as reputable
underwriters perform the certification function to underwrite IPOs with a lower risk profile.
Carter and Manaster (1990) stated that reputable underwriters only undertake high-quality
firms to preserve their reputation. Given that the information production is expensive,
underwriters would sell the equity of firms that go public at offer prices that are greater than
firms’ intrinsic values. This phenomenon can induce amoral hazard issue,which in turn, affect
investors’ interests in the subscription of IPOs (Yung and Zender, 2010). Thus, reputable
underwriters should obtain an approximately fair IPO valuation to mitigate this issue.
However, the above hypothesis contradicts the prevailing view that underwriters act as





(Beatty and Welch, 1996). Chemmanur and Krishnan (2012) found that reputable
underwriters obtain higher valuations of IPOs during the offer price setting and the
immediate aftermarket in the US market. Reputable underwriters are characterised by
greater marketing efforts in promoting IPOs to potential investors for share subscription.
Accordingly, issuers leave more money on the table to the investors due to the promoting
efforts by underwriters (Dimovski et al., 2011; Loughran and Ritter, 2004). Given the greater
participation of reputable underwriters and institutional investors in the IPO market, vast
numbers of retail investors are optimistic on the firms’ prospects. The optimistic behaviour of
retail investors upsurges the heterogeneity in investors’ beliefs on the overvaluation of IPOs
(Miller, 1977).
Collectively, the early literature on underwriter reputation provides useful insight into the
prediction of IPO valuation in emerging markets, specifically Malaysia. Due to the lack of
effectiveness of the capital structure in emerging markets (Eldomiaty, 2008), underwriters
may find it challenging to certify IPOs by setting the offer prices relative to firms’ intrinsic
values and also investors’ evaluation of the aftermarket prices. Despite the existence of many
previous IPO studies on underwriter reputation in emerging markets, very few studies
focussed on the certification role of reputable underwriters in the IPO valuation. This study is
aware of one prior study by Yeh et al. (2008) that focussed on how prestigious underwriters
influenced the valuation of Taiwanese firms when going for listing and in the immediate
aftermarket, yet insignificant results were obtained. Such a phenomenonmay be linked to the
bias in underwriter selection, whereby issuers hire reputable underwriters to certify low-
quality firms. A recent study by Mohd-Rashid et al. (2018) found that issuers engaged
prestigious underwriters to reduce information asymmetry around a new issue and
eventually the offer prices were set at a discount. Baron (1982) stated that reputable
underwriters are selected to issue high-risk IPOs to persuade investors to subscribe to the
IPOs. Under the fixed-price mechanism, while underwriters determine the offer prices
without soliciting investors’ demands, firms’ selection of underwriters may influence the
valuation of firms during IPOs and in the immediate aftermarket. Hence, the examination of
underwriter reputation in IPO valuation is essential.
2.3 Information asymmetry and underwriter reputation
Concerning the high uncertainties in the Malaysian IPO market, this study built the idea of
testing the moderating effect of information asymmetry on the relationship between
underwriter reputation and valuation of IPOs during the offer price setting and immediate
aftermarket. Yung and Zender (2010) proposed that issuers typically find it challenging to
reveal the true values of their firms, eventually resulting in uncertainty. Accordingly, the
existence of greater uncertainties raises the importance of certification. In existing IPO
literature, information asymmetry was proxied by firm size and/or underwriter reputation
(Che-Yahya et al., 2017; Yung and Zender, 2010), demonstrating that the superior qualities of
firms are defined as big firms that prestigious underwriters are inclined to recommend for an
IPO issuance. Che-Yahya et al. (2017) found lower levels of underpricing of large-sized
Malaysian IPOs that were certified by reputable underwriters. Big firms prefer reputable
underwriters who can provide superior information about firms’ prospects. Krigman et al.
(1999) stated that large-sized IPOsdemonstrate loweruncertainties, thus encouraging investors
to hold their shares for the long term to benefit from share price appreciation. Neupane et al.
(2017) informed that investors retain their shares of big and book-built IPOs given these firms
are certified by reputable underwriters. Collectively, the present study contends that big
firms aremore likely to hire reputable underwriters to certify new issues due to the certification
of the firms’ high quality. Thus, this study hypothesises that firm size moderates (strengthens
or weakens) the certification role of reputable underwriters in IPO valuation.
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3. Data and methodology
3.1 Data and sample
A total of 565 listed IPOs on Bursa Malaysia were issued between January 2000 and
December 2017. January 2000 was selected as the beginning period of the present study to
exclude the effects of the Asian financial crisis, which occurred between 1997 and 1998, on the
Malaysian market. The data used in the current study were collected from the firms’
prospectuses on Bursa Malaysia’s website, DataStream, and Bloomberg. For the valuation
accuracy process, this study obtained the data from Bloomberg including trailing 12-month
historical earnings per share (EPS), book values per share (BPS) after adjusting for net
proceeds from IPOs, and trailing 12-month revenues per share (RPS) to compute P/E, P/B and
P/S of the comparable firms, respectively.
Before proceeding with the valuation analysis, this study set the criteria for data
collection. First, IPOs and/or comparable firms with negative EPS and/or BPS must be
excluded from the data samples given that P/E or P/B could have a negative value. Second,
IPOs with special types of offers such as a restricted offer-for-sales to eligible employees and
indigenous investors, tender offers and special issues were omitted from the sample (Mohd-
Rashid et al., 2014). IPOs from selected industry sectors such as Finance, Real Estate
Investment Trusts (REITs), Exchange Traded Funds (ETF) and Special Purpose Acquisition
Companies (SPAC)were also omitted as these firms comprise different presentation formats
of the financial statements. IPOs with incomplete data were also removed from the sample of
the study. After the exclusion of data and extreme outliers IPOs via a data cleansing process,
the total number of IPO samples was 466 IPOs. Table 1 displays the distribution of the
Malaysian IPO samples.
3.2 IPO valuation
Price-multiple approaches are commonly used for valuing IPO firms (How et al., 2007; Kim
and Ritter, 1999). In this study, the selection of comparable firms from identical industries to
approximate the intrinsic value of IPOs was considered as a practical approach due to their
similar revenue characteristics. This study adopted the methodology by Kim and Ritter
(1999) by selecting five comparable firms based on identical industries with the closest
revenues. The industry classification was determined using Bloomberg. Furthermore, the
price-multiples of the selected five comparable firms were used to compute the median of
comparable firms’ price-multiples to eliminate the outlier problem that causes extreme
multiples and biased estimation (How et al., 2007).
The IPO valuation accuracy was initially tested to determine which price-multiple method
exhibited a high precision of valuation accuracy. This study adopted the methodology
suggested by Kim and Ritter (1999) by employing three types of multiples, namely, P/E, P/B
and P/S in determining the best valuation model for the issuance of Malaysian IPOs. The
standard measure of IPO valuation accuracy was based on the calculation of IPO valuation
Description Number of IPOs
Number of IPOs before exclusion 565
– Total number of IPOs with negative EPS and/or BPS 5
– Total number of IPOs issue through special types of offers 33
– Total number of IPOs from finance, REIT, SPAC and ETF sectors 36
– Total number of IPOs with incomplete data 13
– Total number of outliers 12
Total number of final IPO samples 466
Table 1.
The selection process







error. Accordingly, this study adopted the formula of IPO valuation error by How et al. (2007)
and Roosenboom (2012) in comparing the degrees to which the intrinsic values of the firm
were estimated according to the comparable firms. The formulae for computing the valuation
error are shown below:
ValuationError ¼ ðP  V Þ
V
(1)
where P denotes the offer price, first-day market price, average first-week price or average
first-month price, whereas V represents the intrinsic value of firms computed from the
multiplication of IPO firms’ value drivers (e.g.EPS,BPS orRPS) using themedian value of the
price-multiples for five comparable firms. The best valuation model was determined by
looking for a negative and small valuation error. The selected valuation model from the
valuation accuracy analysis was used to calculate the IPO valuation ratio for four different
prices. The calculation of the relative IPOvaluation ratio (P/V)was based on themethodology
by Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004), who compared IPOs’ prices to themedianmarket
prices of comparable firms. Specifically, this study computed the valuation ratios for the IPOs


















Ordinary least square (OLS) regressionmodels were employed in the present study to analyse
the influence of underwriter reputation on the ratios of IPO valuation in the Malaysian
market. The regression models are developed as per the following:
ðP=V Þop;i ¼ β0 þ β1UNDRWi þ β2PRIVi þ β3PUBLICi þ β4OFFERi þ β5DBOOKi
þ β6LNNTAi þ β7CRISISi þ β8MKTCONi þ β9OSRi þ ε (6)
ðP=V Þcp;i ¼ β0 þ β1UNDRWi þ β2PRIVi þ β3PUBLICi þ β4OFFERi þ β5DBOOKi
þ β6LNNTAi þ β7CRISISi þ β8MKTCONi þ β9OSRi þ ε (7)
ðP=V Þweek;i ¼ β0 þ β1UNDRWi þ β2PRIVi þ β3PUBLICi þ β4OFFERi þ β5DBOOKi
þ β6LNNTAi þ β7CRISISi þ β8MKTCONi þ β9OSRi þ ε (8)
ðP=V Þmonth;i ¼ β0 þ β1UNDRWi þ β2PRIVi þ β3PUBLICi þ β4OFFERi þ β5DBOOKi
þ β6LNNTAi þ β7CRISISi þ β8MKTCONi þ β9OSRi þ ε (9)
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where P/V is the IPO valuation ratio measured as the price-multiple of the IPO for four
different prices (e.g. offer price, first-day market price, average first-week price and average
first-month price) and price-multiple of comparable firms. UNDRW was measured based on





UNDTi 5 Total underwriting amount for the ith underwriters in the listing year and
TOTUNDTi 5 Total underwriting amount in ith listing year.
An underwriter is considered prestigious if the amount of proceeds raised by that
underwriter is greater than the average of the total underwriting amount in the particular







1 ¼ IPO underwritten by a prestigious underwriter





PRIV is calculated as the number of new shares allocated to institutional investors as a
percentage of the number of shares offered in an IPO. Based on signalling theory, greater
institutional ownership conveys the signal of better firm quality and an approximately fair
valuation of the IPO. PUBLIC is measured as the number of shares issued to retail investors
as a percentage of the number of shares offered in an IPO. Based on the winner’s curse
hypothesis (Rock, 1986), a greater proportion of shares allocated to retail investors will
develop a “lemon” issue for retail investors because these shares are expected to generate a
loss. IPOs would be undervalued because investors might be less interested in subscribing to
IPOs with high public ownership.OFFER is computed as the number of shares issued via an
offer-for-sales over the total number of shares before issuing the IPO (Mohd-Rashid et al.,
2018). A high proportion of shares offered by insiders signals the worst quality of firms to the
market, which contributes to an undervaluation of IPOs.
DBOOK refers to the dummy for the book-building mechanism which carries a value of 1
for IPOs which are priced using the book-building mechanism and 0 for the fixed-price
mechanism. According to Kutsana and Smith (2004), book-built IPOs result in low
information asymmetries of firms because investors’ views are incorporated during the
roadshows. In situations where investors’ opinions are informative, approximately fair
valuations of book-built IPOs might be estimated. LNNTA is the natural log of the net
tangible asset that serves as a proxy for firm size (Wan-Hussin, 2005). Firmswith a higher net
tangible asset values are referred to as large firms that exhibit less uncertainty in obtaining
fair valuation of IPOs. CRISIS denotes as the dummy for the sub-prime financial crisis, which
carries a value of 1 for IPOs listed during the sub-prime financial crisis period and 0 for
otherwise. Firms listed during the crisis periodmight be exposed to greater risks, which could
influence the IPO valuation. Further, stock market condition,MKTCON, is the sentiment of
stock market investors while deciding on an IPO subscription. It was measured using the
percentage of the difference between the price index upon listing and the price index on the
offer over the price index on the offer date in terms of FTSE Bursa Malaysia EMAS (Mohd-
Rashid et al., 2014). It was hypothesised that a lower valuation of the IPOs listed during a
bullish market could ensure that the offerings are fully subscribed. Finally, investor demand
(OSR) was measured as the total number of IPOs subscribed over the number of shares
offered to the public (Tajuddin et al., 2018). Firms with greater prospects send signals about





Furthermore, the moderating effect of firm’s quality was analysed across reputable and
non-reputable underwriters. In this study, firm size (LNNTA)was used as a proxy for firm’s
quality, which was then multiplied with underwriter reputation (UNDRW) (Yung and
Zender, 2010). Arthurs et al. (2009) and Abdullah and Taufil-Mohd (2004) stated that
recognising the definition of low information asymmetry, large-sized IPO issuers are inclined
to choose reputable underwriters who have superior information about issues for their IPO
issuance. The moderating models were formalised as follows:
ðP=V Þop;i ¼ β0 þ β1UNDRWi þ β2ðUNDRW3LNNTAÞi þ β3PRIVi þ β4PUBLICi
þ β5OFFERi þ β6DBOOKi þ β7LNNTAi þ β8CRISISi þ β9MKTCONi
þ β10OSRi þ ε (11)
ðP=V Þop;i ¼ β0 þ β1UNDRWi þ β2ðUNDRW3LNNTAÞi þ β3PRIVi þ β4PUBLICi
þ β5OFFERi þ β6DBOOKi þ β7LNNTAi þ β8CRISISi þ β9MKTCONi
þ β10OSRi þ ε (12)
ðP=VÞweek;i ¼ β0 þ β1UNDRWi þ β2ðUNDRW3LNNTAÞi þ β3PRIVi þ β4PUBLICi
þ β5OFFERi þ β6DBOOKi þ β7LNNTAi þ β8CRISISi þ β9MKTCONi
þ β10OSRi þ ε (13)
ðP=V Þmonth;i ¼ β0 þ β1UNDRWi þ β2ðUNDRW3LNNTAÞi þ β3PRIVi þ β4PUBLICi
þ β5OFFERi þ β6DBOOKi þ β7LNNTAi þ β8CRISISi þ β9MKTCONi
þ β10OSRi þ ε
(14)
4. Empirical findings and discussion
4.1 Descriptive statistics of firms’ characteristics
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of firms’ characteristics from 466 Malaysian IPOs
were issued between January 2000 and December 2017. The average value of the IPO offer
price was RM1.06, whereas the first-day market price obtained an average value of RM1.30.
The highest values for the offer price and first-daymarket price reached RM6.50 and RM7.50,
respectively, while the lowest values were RM0.12 and RM0.14, respectively. The average
first-week price and average first-month prices were RM1.29 and RM1.27, respectively, with
the same standard deviation of RM1.06. It indicates high dispersions in the average first-week
price and average first-month price. For the independent variable, the underwriter reputation
dummy reported an average of 0.365. It means that 36.5% of the total IPO sample firms
appointed high-quality underwriters to certify their issues.
For the control variables, the book-building dummy recorded an average of 0.08,
demonstrating that 8% of the total IPO sample firms used book-building for issuing IPOs.
The percentage of institutional ownership recorded an average of 43.95%. In the year 2000,
there were no institutional investors in new issues or 0%, which was expected as private
placement was introduced in the year 2001 in the Malaysian IPO market (Yong, 2010).
Furthermore, public ownership obtained an average of 21.47%. It is believed that the IPOs’
public spread did not fulfil the Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia, which requires at
MF
least 25% of new issues to be allocated to the public. Also, the firms’ existing shareholders
offered an average of 12.068% of the existing shares as an offer-for-sale. For the crisis
dummy, an average of 0.12 was obtained, indicating that 12% of the total IPO sample firms
were listed during this period. Market condition was reflected by the EMAS index during the
IPO listing, which had an average value of 0.489%with the highest return of 11.602%and the
lowest return of 14.724%.
4.2 Descriptive statistics of the IPO valuation
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of the price-multiples. The mean P/S of the IPOs
scaled at four different prices ranged from 2.419 to 2.952. The values were slightly smaller
than the mean P/S of comparable firms scaled at four different prices, which ranged from
4.392 to 4.507. For the average P/E scaled at four different prices, the IPO samples obtained
values ranging from 14.406 to 18.340, which were substantially smaller than the values for
comparable firms that ranged from 52.658 to 53.819. The high P/E of comparable firms
compared to the P/E of the IPOs scaled at four different prices could be attributed to the
precision of earnings that were reported in the prospectuses. This argument supports Kim
and Ritter (1999), which reported that earnings are expected to have noisy estimates due to
the error in the true economic earnings. Finally, despite the remarkable usefulness of
accounting numbers, their accuracy is questionable. Hence, the current study argues that
issuers incline to underprice the offer prices to allure investors to subscribe to their IPOs. The
average P/B of the IPO samples scaled at four different prices ranged from 1.818 to 2.249,
higher than the mean P/B of comparable firms which ranged from 1.264 to 1.278. The high
P/B of the IPOs based on four different prices compared to the P/B of comparable firmsmight
have been driven by the arbitrariness of book values, which is amassive change from pre-IPO
to post-IPO issuance.
4.3 Valuation accuracy of IPOs
Table 4 presents the results of valuation error based on P/E, P/B and P/S. This study noticed
that usingP/S to value the IPO firms generated the least valuation errors, followed byP/E and
Mean Max Min SD
Offer price (RM) 1.057 6.500 0.120 0.799
First-day market price (RM) 1.295 7.500 0.140 1.042
Average first-week price (RM) 1.289 6.900 0.134 1.060
Average first-month price (RM) 1.271 6.899 0.134 1.058
Initial return (%) 27.041 404.167 59.412 50.006
Earnings per share (RM) 0.104 1.270 0.001 0.101
Book value per share (RM) 0.723 9.630 0.035 0.704
Revenue per share (RM) 0.923 10.069 0.004 1.114
Underwriter reputation (Dummy) 0.365 1.000 0 0.482
Institutional ownership (%) 43.822 100.00 0 0.304
Book-building (Dummy) 0.077 100.00 0 0.267
Public ownership (%) 21.538 100.00 0 18.775
Offer-to-sales (%) 12.119 100.00 0 18.110
Net tangibles asset (RM million unit) 217 15,800 4.402 1030
Crisis (Dummy) 0.116 1.000 0 0.320
Market condition (%) 0.264 11.602 23.373 4.617
Investor demand (Times) 30.234 377.960 0.891 44.825
Note(s): IPO sample size (N)5 466, beginning from January 2000 to December 2017. EPS5 trailing 12-month
historical earnings per share; BPS 5 book values per share after adjusted for net proceeds; RPS 5 trailing









P/B. In Panel A of Table 4, P/S has an average valuation error of 32.0%. In other words,
using the median P/S of five comparable firms can lead to an average offer price that is 32.0%
lower than the firms’ intrinsic values. P/S is appropriate to be used for firms’ value estimation
as inconsistent earnings might be obtained in several consecutive years before listing
amongst numerous firms. As shown in Panels B, C and D of Table 4, P/S produced a high
precision of IPO valuation with valuation errors ranging from13.9 to15.0% compared to
the offer price. This study suggests that the intrinsic values estimated by P/S are closer to the
first-day market price than to the offer price. How et al. (2007) found it puzzling that the
estimated intrinsic value using an algorithm was closer to the first-day market price.
Deliberate underpricing by underwriters can be used to explain the findings. In this study,
P/Swas selected as an ideal valuation model, which was further applied to the IPO valuation
ratio, P/V (Purnanamdam and Swaminathan, 2004). The P/V based on P/S was later
regressed by the independent and control variables, and the results are shown in Table 8.
4.4 Distribution of IPO valuation ratios
Before proceeding with the regression analysis, this study calculated the distribution of IPO
valuation ratios based on P/S, as shown in Table 5. This study used Wilcoxon rank analysis
to test the null hypothesis that the median P/V_P/S is equal to 1. The median P/V_P/S for the
IPO samples scaled at four different prices ranged from 0.484 to 0.560 were significantly
lower than 1. These findings indicate that the IPOs were undervalued at the offer price, first-
day market price, average first-week price and average first-month price. Moreover, the low
value of median P/V_P/Sop was because of the choice of fixed-price mechanism amongst the
IPO firms Comparable firms’ medians
Mean Max Min SD Mean Max Min SD
P/Eop 14.406 147.616 1.220 12.455 52.658 301.923 6.577 32.875
P/Ecp 18.340 158.971 1.464 18.118 53.819 312.500 6.612 33.404
P/Eweek 18.186 158.463 1.398 18.285 53.720 311.310 6.683 33.177
P/Emonth 17.957 151.969 1.411 18.303 53.564 307.885 7.181 32.272
P/Bop 1.818 14.362 0.039 1.115 1.278 3.999 0.336 0.669
P/Bcp 2.249 14.362 0.046 1.411 1.264 4.119 0.275 0.649
P/Bweek 2.231 13.664 0.046 1.418 1.267 3.722 0.326 0.654
P/Bmonth 2.206 12.874 0.045 1.444 1.267 3.566 0.313 0.659
P/Sop 2.419 39.305 0.150 3.161 4.438 79.917 0.259 4.761
P/Scp 2.997 45.737 0.150 4.007 4.507 78.404 0.248 5.375
P/Sweek 2.966 47.319 0.144 3.918 4.392 78.994 0.246 4.691
P/Smonth 2.952 53.276 0.134 4.132 4.367 78.845 0.249 4.675
Note(s): IPO sample size (N)5 466, beginning from January 2000 to December 2017. The present study uses
trailing twelve-month historical earnings per share, book values per share after adjusted for net proceeds and
trailing 12-month of historical revenues per share to calculate price-to-earnings, price-to-book and price-to-
sales, respectively. The price-multiples of selected five comparable firms (based on similar industry and closest
revenue) were used to compute in a median of comparable firm price-multiples. Offer price-to-earnings (P/Eop),
offer price-to-book (P/Bop) and offer price-to-sales (P/Sop) were calculated using the offer price for the IPO firms,
and the market prices on the day before issuing for the comparable firms. First-day price-to-earnings (P/Ecp),
first-day price-to-book (P/Bcp) and first-day price-to-sales (P/Scp) were calculated using the first-day market
price for the IPO firm, and the market prices on the listing date for the comparable firms. Average first-week
price-to-earnings (P/Eweek), average first-week price-to-book (P/Bweek) and average first-week price-to-sales (P/
Sweek) were calculated using the average first-week price for the IPO firm, and the market prices on the average
first-week days after listing for the comparable firms. Average first-month price-to-earnings (P/Emonth),
average first-month price-to-book (P/Bmonth) and average first-month price-to-sales (P/Smonth) were calculated
using the average first-month price for the IPO firm and the average month of market prices on the average





Malaysian IPOs as the offer prices were set without incorporating investors’ views of the
firms. This statement is supported byYeh et al. (2008), which found amedianP/V_P/Sop value
of 0.590. Besides, the median P/V_P/S based on aftermarket prices were slightly higher than
the P/V_P/Sop during the listing. Even though the IPOs were not overvalued compared to the
intrinsic values, the firms’ intrinsic valuesmight be reflected in the IPO prices after more than
a month.
4.5 Correlation analysis
The results of the Pearson correlation analysis between the variables and IPO valuation
based on P/S were displayed in Table 6. As indicated in the table, none of the correlations
exceeded the 0.70 cut-off point, indicating there is no multicollinearity issue in the
correlations.
4.6 Mean difference between reputable and non-reputable underwriter groups
Table 7 describes the mean difference test between the IPOs backed by reputable and non-
reputable underwriter groups. The IPO valuation ratios (P/V_P/Scp and P/V_P/Smonth) varied
across the reputable and non-reputable underwriter groups. Themean P/V_P/Scp and P/V_P/
Smonth values for the reputable and non-reputable underwriter groups ranged from 0.735 to
0.742 and from 0.910 to 0.928, respectively. Non-reputable underwriters are inclined to
involve actively in IPO issuances to obtain a low valuation error and price stabilisation.
Moreover, OFFER, DBOOK and LNNTA varied significantly across the reputable and non-
reputable underwriter groups. The mean OFFER for the reputable and non-reputable
underwriter groups were 16.523% and 9.590%, respectively. IPOs with greater proportions
of existing share offerings tended to be underwritten by reputable underwriters. Meanwhile,
the mean DBOOK for the reputable and non-reputable underwriter groups were 0.180 and
0.017, respectively. Finally, the mean LNNTA were 18.467 and 17.766 for the reputable and
Mean Median Max Min SD
Panel A – valuation errors calculated using offer price
P/E 0.669*** 0.746 1.683 0.963 0.291
P/B 0.697*** 0.405 7.520 0.963 1.103
P/S 0.320*** 0.516 5.722 0.953 0.686
Panel B – valuation errors calculated using first-day market price
P/E 0.602*** 0.700 2.034 0.959 0.373
P/B 1.051*** 0.671 7.173 0.950 1.310
P/S 0.139*** 0.440 9.583 0.977 1.047
Panel C – valuation errors calculated using average first-week price
P/E 0.613*** 0.707 2.012 0.966 0.345
P/B 1.023*** 0.648 7.955 0.950 1.306
P/S 0.150*** 0.441 9.501 0.956 1.046
Panel D – valuation errors calculated using average first-month price
P/E 0.623*** 0.718 1.696 0.977 0.328
P/B 0.998*** 0.607 7.162 0.952 1.327
P/S 0.149*** 0.441 8.631 0.959 1.079
Note(s): Valuation error is (PV) /V, where P is the offer price in Panel A, the first-daymarket price in Panel B,
the average first-week price in Panel C and the average first-month price in Panel D; V is the intrinsic value
estimated by either P/E, P/B or P/S based on the median of five comparable firms with similar industry and
closest revenue. The highlighted adjusted valuewith the symbol: *** represents significance level at 1%,which
is based on the t-test for the difference from zero
Table 4.








non-reputable groups, respectively. Large and book-built IPOs tended to be underwritten by
reputable underwriters.
4.7 Regression results between underwriter reputation and IPO valuation
Table 8 illustrates the findings from the multiple regression on the estimation of IPO
valuation scaled at four different prices by the reputation of underwriters. There was no
autocorrelation issue after the correction using the Newey–West method because the
Durbin–Watson values were between 2.038 and 2.063. The adjusted R2 values were less than
10% for the four regression models. These values indicate that all the variables could explain
less than 10% of the variations in the IPO valuation models. Furthermore, the variance
inflation factor (VIF) for all the regression models ranged from 1.097 to 2.523, indicating the
absence of multicollinearity issues. Finally, the F-statistics values for the regression models
were significant, and the goodness-of-fit of the models (p < 0.01) was confirmed.
For the independent variable, the findings revealed that underwriter reputation
(UNDRW) was inversely related to IPO valuation, which is relative to firms’ intrinsic
values, based on the offer price (P/V_P/Sop) and aftermarket prices (P/V_P/Scp and P/V_P/
Smonth) at the significant level of 10%. FromModel 1 of Table 8, the negative sign ofUNDRW
revealed that reputable underwriters incorporated acquired information into the IPO
issuance by setting the firms’ offer prices lower than the intrinsic values. Such intuition could
be linked to the principle-agent theory by Baron (1982). Underwriters set offer prices below
the market equilibrium to allure investors to subscribe to IPOs and to reduce the likelihood of
having to absorb losses for unsold shares. The negative result is consistent with Mohd-
Rashid et al. (2018), which found that prestigious underwriters priced IPOs lower to attract
investors into the IPO market. In the emerging market environment, issuers spend huge
amounts to hire prestigious underwriters to certify firms that have greater risks. To allure
investors to subscribe to IPOs, reputable underwriters are inclined to set the offer pricesmuch
lower than firms’ intrinsic values.
FromModels 2 to 4 of Table 8, the negative signs ofUNDRW revealed that IPOs that used
high-ranked underwriters experienced lower aftermarket prices compared to the firms’
intrinsic values after a month of listing. The result indicates that investors prefer quick
capital gains from IPOs rather than perceiving firms’ qualities. This argument is supported
by Albada et al. (2019), where the signals of firms’ qualities conveyed by reputable
underwriters did not trigger investors’ demand for IPO shares. Investors sell their shares in
the aftermarket since they perceive high levels of uncertainties of IPOs, which motivate the
selling of shares by investors. The share selling activities drag the IPO values to below the
intrinsic values after a month.
Mean 25th quartile 50th quartile 75th quartile Wilcoxon Z-statistics
P/V_P/Sop 0.680 0.285 0.484 0.833 13.891***
P/V_P/Scp 0.860 0.343 0.560 0.988 10.786***
P/V_P/Sweek 0.850 0.346 0.559 1.006 10.931***
P/V_P/Smonth 0.851 0.336 0.559 0.963 11.137***
Note(s): This table displays the distribution of IPO valuation based on price-to-sales (P/S). P/V ratios are
computed as the ratio of the price-to-sales of IPOs divided by the corresponding market-price-to-sales of the
comparable firm. The price-multiples of the IPO firms are based on offer price, first-day market price, average
first-week price and average first-month price.Wilcoxon z-statistics is based onWilcoxon rank sum test on the
hypothesis that the IPO price-multiples follow the same distribution as those of the comparable firms
Table 5.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































For the control variables, PRIV had a significant positive relationship with IPO valuation in
Models 1 and 4, as shown in Table 8. The higher proportion of shares allocated to institutional
investors signalled that the underwriters set the offer prices closer to firms’ intrinsic values,
and uninformed investors participated in the IPOs due to the firms’ qualities. The next
variable, PUBLIC, had a negative relationship with P/V_P/Sop, P/V_P/Scp and P/V_P/Sweek.
Based on the winner’s curse hypothesis (Rock, 1986), retail investors received greater share
allocations from IPOs with the worst qualities, which would generate losses after listing and
experience undervaluation. Further, OFFER had a significant negative effect on IPO
Variable
Underwriter reputation Mean differences t-test
Reputable Non-reputable t-statistics
P/V_P/Sop 0.629 0.709 0.080 1.213
P/V_P/Scp 0.742 0.928 0.186 1.849*
P/V_P/Sweek 0.746 0.910 0.164 1.631
P/V_P/Smonth 0.735 0.918 0.183 1.764*
PRIV (%) 41.469 45.173 3.704 1.266
PUBLIC (%) 20.976 21.861 0.885 0.490
OFFER (%) 16.523 9.590 6.933 4.043***
DBOOK 0.180 0.017 - 0.163 6.733***
LNNTA 18.467 17.766 0.701 6.571***
CRISIS 0.100 0.125 0.025 - 0.810
MKTCON (%) 0.105 0.475 0.580 1.309
OSR (times) 20.364 35.903 15.539 3.650***
Note(s): *** and * denote statistical significance at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively. This study
segregated the sample of 466 IPOs into 170 IPOs issued by reputable underwriters and 296 IPOs issued by non-
reputable underwriters






UNDRW 0.089* (0.053) 0.135* (0.079) 0.123 (0.078) 0.157* (0.084)
Control Variables
PRIV 0.215* (0.124) 0.239 (0.163) 0.244 (0.162) 0.297* (0.175)
PUBLIC 0.436*** (0.168) 0.515** (0.220) 0.530** (0.267) 0.194 (0.387)
OFFER 0.200 (0.173) 0.422** (0.214) 0.458** (0.224) 0.402* (0.233)
DBOOK 0.341** (0.149) 0.391** (0.194) 0.363* (0.196) 0.374* (0.149)
LNNTA 0.046 (0.038) 0.054 (0.055) 0.036 (0.055) 0.025 (0.057)
CRISIS 0.010 (0.092) 0.186* (0.099) 0.201** (0.097) 0.233** (0.097)
MKTCON 0.013** (0.006) 0.011 (0.008) 0.010 (0.008) 0.014* (0.008)
OSR 0.000 (0.001) 0.004** (0.002) 0.003* (0.002) 0.003* (0.002)
C 1.528** (0.701) 1.833* (0.985) 1.515 (0.975) 1.222 (1.064)
Observation 466 466 466 466
Adjusted R2 0.050 0.070 0.063 0.047
F-statistics 3.630*** 4.917*** 4.473*** 3.530***
Durbin–
Watson
2.054 2.038 2.059 2.063
VIF Range 1.097–2.422 1.234–2.400 1.234–2.523 1.270–2.442
Note(s): Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity problems are determined by conducting Durbin–Watson test
and White test, respectively followed with the correction by Newey–West Covariance Estimator. The












valuation based on aftermarket prices, as shown in Models 2 to 4. Higher proportions of
shares offered by the firms’ existing shareholders to investors signalled the worst quality of
firms, resulting in undervaluation of the IPOs.
For Models 1 to 4 in Table 8, the findings for DBOOK indicate that the Malaysian IPOs
priced using the book-building mechanism significantly had approximately fair valuations
given investors’ demands were incorporated into the IPO pricing. This finding is consistent
with the reduction in information asymmetries, as stated by Kutsana and Smith (2004). Next,
the present study found that LNNTA had an insignificant association with IPO valuation in
all the regression models, indicating that the underwriters and investors did not emphasise
on firm size when valuing the IPOs.
For Models 2 to 4 in Table 8, the results for CRISIS indicate that the IPOs listed during the
global financial crisis period were undervalued substantially in the aftermarket. These
findings are supported by Tajuddin et al. (2018), who stated that IPOs going public in the
global financial crisis period faced greater risks. Thus, investors became pessimistic of the
IPOs’ values in the aftermarket during a bearish market. Further, stock market condition
(MKTCON) had a significant negative relationship with P/V_P/Sop. In other words, the
underwriters reduced the issuers’ offer prices below the intrinsic values to attract investors to
subscribe to the shares given the firms were going to be listed during a bullish market. The
last control variable is investor demand (OSR), which found that greater investor demand
drove the prices closer to the firms’ intrinsic values in the immediate aftermarket. This result
supports Aggarwal et al. (2009), which found that investors are likely to subscribe to high-
quality IPOs, thus causing the share prices to appreciate in the aftermarket.
4.8 Regression results of the moderating effect of firm size
Due to the presence of greater ex ante uncertainties around IPOs, particularly in the Malaysian
market, this study tested the effect of the moderating variable, namely LNNTA, on the
association between the underwriter reputation and IPOvaluation.Accordingly, the findings of
Model 1 in Table 9 reported the interaction term between underwriter reputation and net
tangible asset (UNDRW*LNNTA) had a positive relationship with P/V_P/Sop. This study
interprets that large-sized IPOs obtain approximately fair valuationswhen theyuse prestigious
underwriters. Such intuition is linked to the explanation based on certification theory
(Meginsson and Weiss, 1991). Reputable underwriters prefer big firms, which are associated
with lower levels of risks or higher qualities, to protect their reputation (Arthurs et al., 2009;
Titman and Trueman, 1986). Reputable underwriters are more effective at producing clear and
better information on IPOs. The result is consistent with Che-Yahya et al. (2017) and Yung and
Zender (2010), which stated that prestigious underwriters put less underpricing on large-sized
IPOs. That said, big firms are associated with high quality in an emerging market and have
their offer prices set by reputable underwriters closer to the intrinsic values. Upon an IPO
listing, this arrangement promotes the transparency of new issues.
Based on Models 2 to 4 of Table 9, the significant positive effects of
UNDRW*CENT_LNNTA were found after estimating the IPO valuations in the immediate
aftermarket. The results indicate that large-sized firms that use reputable underwriters to
certify their IPOs have their aftermarket prices driven closer to the firms’ intrinsic values after
a month of listing. As investors keep high-quality IPOs which were certified by prestigious
underwriters, they tend to retain the IPO shares of large-sized firms a longer period.
Henceforth, using reputable underwriters can stabilise the aftermarket prices of big firms. The
results are supported by Neupane et al. (2017), which stated that using reputable underwriters
to certify IPOs could reduce the flipping activity of investors. Investors are expected to gain
steady and growing returns from high-quality IPOs in the future. This study supports





prestigious underwriters for the IPO issuance improves the long-run performance in emerging
markets.
5. Conclusion and implications
The purpose of the current study is to examine whether the reputation of underwriters could
influence the valuation ofMalaysian IPOs. This study collected the data on 466 IPOs listed on
BursaMalaysia from January 2000 to December 2017. The current study conducted the test of
valuation accuracy to identify which price-multiple amongst P/E, P/B and P/S obtained the
least valuation error. Accordingly, P/S was chosen as an appropriate approach for valuing
Malaysian firms. P/S was further applied in the IPO valuation ratio (P/V) and in examining
the relationship between underwriter reputation and IPO valuation ratios based on offer price
and aftermarket prices (first-day market price, average first-week price and average first-
month price).
The OLS results showed that underwriter reputation had a significant negative
association with IPO valuation. This study confirms the findings of a prior study by
Mohd-Rashid et al. (2018), which found reputable underwriters set offer prices lower than
firms’ intrinsic values to reduce the probability of having to repurchase unsold IPO shares.
Nevertheless, the certification of IPOs seemed to be influenced by information asymmetry,
which in turn reduced firms’ values in the immediate aftermarket. In other words, investors
perceived investments in the firms to have a high risk, which induced them to dispose of their
shares in the immediate aftermarket. The outcomes of this study differ from those done on











UNDRW 0.025 (0.079) 0.096 (0.118) 0.092 (0.118) 0.028 (0.128)
Moderating variable
UNDRW*CENT_LNNTA 0.098* (0.057) 0.198** (0.091 0.185** (0.089) 0.159* (0.090)
Control variables
PRIV 0.188 (0.129) 0.184 (0.169) 0.193 (0.169) 0.253 (0.182)
PUBLIC 0.420** (0.168) 0.483** (0.219) 0.500** (0.227) 0.168 (0.385)
OFFER 0.205 (0.173) 0.432** (0.214) 0.468** (0.224) 0.411* (0.234)
DBOOK 0.248* (0.145) 0.202 (0.171) 0.187 (0.176) 0.223 (0.181)
LNNTA 0.087** (0.043) 0.138** (0.062) 0.115* (0.060) 0.092 (0.067)
CRISIS 0.010 (0.091) 0.185* (0.099) 0.200** (0.097) 0.231** (0.096)
MKTCON 0.012* (0.006) 0.009 (0.008) 0.009 (0.008) 0.013 (0.009)
OSR 0.000 (0.001) 0.003** (0.001) 0.003* (0.002) 0.003* (0.002)
C 2.282*** (0.807) 3.355*** (1.129) 2.934*** (1.106) 2.443* (1.263)
Observation 466 466 466 466
Adjusted R2 0.051 0.077 0.069 0.050
F-statistics 3.519*** 4.892*** 4.425*** 3.444***
Durbin–Watson 2.053 2.034 2.055 2.060
VIF Range 1.204–3.227 1.226–4.291 1.241–4.163 1.275–4.366
Note(s): Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity problems are determined by conducting Durbin–Watson test
and White test, respectively followed with the correction by Newey–West Covariance Estimator. The
highlighted adjusted values with the symbols: *, ** and *** represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively. UNDRW*CENT_LNNTA represents the moderating term of the underwriter reputation






environment. Given US IPOs use the book-building mechanism, issuers prefer reputable
underwriters to certify their IPOs so that the offer prices will reflect the true values of firms
and institutional investors’ demands. Thus, an approximately fair valuation is obtained
(Chua, 2014). Subsequently, investors obtain a higher valuation of the IPOs during the
intermediate aftermarket as retail investors perceive the firms to be of high quality and also
due to the marketing effort of reputable underwriters (Chemmanur and Krishnan, 2012).
To extend the understanding of the influence of information asymmetry on IPO valuation,
this study tested the moderating effect of firm size on the influence of underwriter reputation
on IPO valuation. Accordingly, underwriter reputation was found to be significantly and
positively related to the valuation of firms during IPOs and the immediate aftermarket. The
findings have implications in the theoretical aspect. This study supports certification theory
after incorporating the firm size factor in the IPO valuation models. The results indicate the
ability of reputable underwriters to certify big-firms (high-quality firms), which in turn
improve the accuracy of the offer price in emergingmarkets. Furthermore, the positive results
of the IPO valuation model in the immediate aftermarket suggest that investors perceive
large-sized firms to be of high quality. Thus, investors tend to continue to subscribe to the
IPOs for a longer period as high-quality firms generate steady growth returns.
The results of this study havemajor practical implications for issuers and investors. In the
Malaysian market, which is subject to severe uncertainties due to the practice of the fixed-
price system, issuers seek prestigious underwriters to certify firms in ensuring a full
subscription of the share offerings. Large-sized issuers may also appoint reputable
underwriters to certify their IPOs if they prefer to signal their low-risk profile and
transparency of new share issues. Such intuition persuades the IPO offer prices to be
determined closer to the intrinsic values of firms. Furthermore, investors who are risk-averse
and anticipate to invest for a longer period should look for large-sized IPOs that are certified
by prestigious underwriters. This is because investors are informed about prestigious
underwriters who provide superior information on large firms. Henceforth, although low
initial returns may be received, investors are optimistic of the long-run performance of big
firms backed by reputable underwriters, as such IPOs will produce stable, rising, long-run
returns and boost the values of firms.
The findings on IPO valuation models can be valuable to regulatory agencies and
policymakers such as the Securities Commission (SC) and Bursa Malaysia in formulating the
most suitable policies for Malaysian IPOs. The results provide policymakers with knowledge
on the efficiency of underwriters in valuing IPOs. Hence, policymakers need to set guidelines
on the range of offer prices that serve as references for underwriters in pricing IPOs. Overall,
Malaysian IPOs were undervalued at firms’ intrinsic values, which indicate that prices were
yet to be stabilised within the first month after the IPO listing. This undervaluation condition
has led this study to recognise that the models for estimating IPO valuations are not fully
explained. For future research, this study suggests to further develop the existing valuation
models by including other pre-IPO information from the prospectuses, for instance, auditor
reputation.
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